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CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION-THE FIRST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS
Van Mayhall*
The landmark decisions by the United States Supreme Court in
Eisner v. Macomber' and Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v.
Smietanka' defined the term "income" within the context of the six-
teenth amendment' to the United States Constitution to encompass
"gain derived from capital, from labor or both combined, provided it
be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion
of capital assets."' Following those cases, the development of a com-
plete scheme for capital gains taxation has been a vexing and con-
tinuing problem to which no real solution has been found. Separate
and preferential taxation of capital transactions is a principle unique
among most industrialized nations.' Indeed, the presence of this
principle in the income tax laws of the United States is largely
responsible for the complexity of those laws. Not only has separate
and preferential taxation of capital gains created theoretical difficul-
ties, but the practical application of the statutes has been uneven
and, perhaps in some cases, unjust. While many foreign taxpayers
do not understand the rationale for capital gains taxation in the
United States, most American taxpayers do not understand how
their capital gains are taxed. Seemingly, the very hint of under-
standing by the American taxpayer of a capital transaction taxing
statute has been cause for Congress to scrap mischievously that
statute and replace it with a more complex and circumspect model.
From the inception of preferential treatment in the Revenue Act of
1921,' capital gains taxation has bobbed like an anchorless dinghy
awash a turbulent sea of conflicting economic and legislative in-
terests.
*Member, Baton Rouge Bar.
1. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
2. 255 U.S. 509 (1921). The phrase first appeared in Stratton's Independence v.
Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913), interpreting the corporation tax of 1909. The proviso
was added in Eisner.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
4. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920).
5. Seltzer, Evolution of the Special Legal Status of Capital Gains Under the In-
come Tax, 3 NAT'L TAX J. 18 (1930).
6. Income Tax Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 200-63, 42 Stat. 227.
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
During the early era of capital gains taxation, "profit" from a
capital transaction was not thought to be taxable under an "income
tax" statute. In this era predating the sixteenth amendment, the
federal government made at least two attempts at enacting and ad-
ministrating a federal income tax. The first federal income tax was
enacted during the Civil War and was patterned after an earlier
proposed tax contemplated shortly after the War of 1812. If the War
of 1812 had lasted longer, an income tax probably would have been
imposed, but the war's conclusion made further resort to internal
taxes unnecessary The whole system of internal revenue was
abolished shortly thereafter. The Civil War tax was classified as a
duty or excise in order to avoid direct tax classification.8 Although
enacted under wartime conditions and enforced by an inexperienced
and inadequate administrative body, the statute was important
because of its revenue production aspects. In the early 1870's con-
trary public opinion led to the repeal of the income tax statute.
While the statute was still in force, the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to determine the meaning of the word "income." The
operative language of the 1867 Act" provided that a certain tax
would be levied, collected, and paid annually upon the amount in ex-
cess of $1,000 of the gains, profits, and income of every person,
declaring that "the tax herein provided for shall be assessed, col-
lected, and paid upon the gains, profits, and income for the year end-
ing the thirty-first of December next proceeding the time for
levying, collecting, and paying said tax." In the case of Gray v. Darl-
ington,'" the taxpayer sold Treasury notes at an increase of $20,000
over his costs four years earlier. The Court stated:
The question presented is whether the advance in the value of
the bonds, during this period of four years, over their cost,
realized by their sale, was subject to taxation as gains, profits,
or income of the plaintiff for the year in which the bonds were
sold.... The advance in the value of property during a series of
years can, in no just sense, be considered the gains, profits, or
income of any one particular year of the series, although the en-
tire amount of the advance be at one time turned into money by
a sale of the property. The statute looks, with some exceptions,
7. See generally Seligman, The Income Tax, 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
626 (1935).
8. See Nelson, Capital Gains and Losses, 14 TAXES 706 (1936). The tax became
known as the income duty.
9. Internal Revenue Act of 1867, ch. 169, 14 Stat. 471.
10. 82 U.S. (15 Wail.) 63 (1872).
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for subjects of taxation only to annual gains, profits, and income.
S.. The mere fact that property has advanced in value between
the date of its acquisition and sale does not authorize the im-
position of the tax on the amount of the advance. Mere advance
in value in no sense constitutes the gains, profits, or income
specified by the statute. It constitutes and can be treated merely
as increase of capital."
Thus, the United States Supreme Court in 1872, while grounding the
Darlington opinion on statutory construction, nonetheless apparently
held that increases in value built up in securities over a number of
years were returns of capital and not within the meaning of the
term "income," at least not under the Civil War Income Tax.
The second experiment by the federal government in income
taxation was the Income Tax Act of 1894.12 This statute had a short-
lived duration and was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in 1895 in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co." This deci-
sion ultimately led to amendment of the Constitution.
The sixteenth amendment had the sole purpose of eliminating
constitutional restrictions upon income taxation, specifically the re-
quirement of apportionment of a direct tax among the states accord-
ing to census. It provides that "the Congress shall have power to
lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,
without apportionment among the several States, and without
regard to any census or enumeration.""6 Congress availed itself of
this power by virtue of its enactment on February 28, 1913, of a
revenue bill effective on March 1, 1913." The scene was thus set for
another interpretation of the constitutionally undefined term "in-
come."
11. Id. at 65.
12. Income Tax Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509.
13. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1894). Under the 1894
Act, it was held that taxes upon rents and profits of real estate and upon returns from
investments of personal property were, in effect, direct taxes upon the property from
which the income arose. Congress could not impose such taxes, by reason of owner-
ship, without apportioning them among the states according to population.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 provides, in pertinent part, that
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers,
which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of Free Persons, in-
cluding those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not
taxed, three fifths of all other persons.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
17. Income Tax Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
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To further complicate matters, prior to the constitutional
amendment, Congress enacted a tax18 computed by reference to the
incomes of corporations. This earlier tax remained on the federal tax
books until the creation of the income tax. The former was an excise
tax on the privilege of doing business, calculated by using the cor-
poration's income as the base. It was not a corporate income tax.
Several cases 9 presented to the Supreme Court involved the
meaning of the term "income" in relation to this corporate excise
tax, but, significantly, they were not decided until after the effective
date of the sixteenth amendment.
These cases consistently gave a broad interpretation to the
word "income," holding that gains from capital conversions into
cash, even though some additional value increment developed over a
number of years, were nonetheless "income" and included in the ex-
cise tax base. The Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal Co.20 decision is
particularly interesting because, as perhaps realized by the Court,
its facts are virtually identical to those in the Darlington"1 case. In
Gauley Mountain the taxpayer sold shares of stock held for invest-
ment purposes in another mining corporation for a surplus of about
$200,000 over its costs. Under Darlington's rationale the increase
would have been treated as capital and held not subject to taxation
as it was "built up" over a number of years." The statute in Gauley
Mountain provided for imposition of a special excise tax with
respect to the carrying on or doing of business by the corporation,
equivalent to one per centum upon the entire net income over and
above $5,000 received by it from all sources during such year.3 The
Supreme Court wrote:
We do not regard . . . [Darlington] as controlling, because the
language of the act now under consideration is different in
material particulars .... Gains, profits and income for the year
ending the thirty-first of December next preceding [Act of 1867]
conveys a different meaning from "the entire net income . . .
received by it . . . during such year" [Act of 1909.4
The distinction between income "for" a year ending on a certain
date and income received "during" the year seems extremely
18. Corporation Excise Tax Act, ch. 169, § 13, 14 Stat. 471, 477 (1867).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry., 247
U.S. 195 (1918); Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal Co., 247 U.S. 189 (1918); Doyle v. Mit-
chell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
20. 247 U.S. 189 (1918).
21. Gray v. Darlington, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 63 (1872).
22. Id. at 66.
23. Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (emphasis added).
24. 247 U.S. at 191 (emphasis in original).
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technical as there is no income at all "for" a year unless some conver-
sion of the increased value to cash, or its equivalent, has occurred.25
It has been suggested2" that the Court, aware of the sixteenth
amendment and the Revenue Act of 1913, recognized in the cases
under the 1909 Excise Act the revenue implications of clinging to its
Darlington position.
With the appearance of the inevitable challenge to the con-
stitutional or statutory basis for taxation of Darlington-type capital
advances after 1913, the Court could have chosen from two rather
distinct lines of cases2" dealing with the meaning of the word "in-
come." The most notable attack on capital gains taxation was Mer-
chants' Loan and Trust Co. v. Smietanka.28 Factually, it was also vir-
tually indistinguishable from Darlington. The taxpayer sold shares
of stock held for investment and realized an increase of about
$700,000 over cost some four years earlier. The taxpayer contended
that the advance in value, although realized by sale, was not income
within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment. The Court believed
the definition of "income" "to be the commonly understood meaning
of the term which must have been in the minds of the people when
they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution."' The
Court then backtracked and suggested that the word "income" had
the same meaning in the Income Tax Acts of 1913, 1916, and 1917."0
Additionally, the Court concluded that the word in the 1913 Act had
the same meaning" as that given it in interpretations of the Cor-poration Excise Tax Act of 1909:
25. Comment, Profits From Sale of Capital Assets as Income: Taxable Under Six-
teenth Amendment, 19 MICH. L. REV. 854 (1921).
26. Note, Income Tax-Profit on Conversion of Capital Assets is Taxable as In-
come, 16 ILL. L. REV. 68 (1916).
27. The line of cases on the 1909 Excise Tax Act and the meaning of the word "in-
come" were not decided until after the enactment of the sixteenth amendment; there-
fore, these decisions could not have been considered by the drafters of the amendment.
28. 255 U.S. 509 (1921).
29. Id. at 519.
30. Id. at 520.
31. This conclusion was reached notwithstanding the Court's earlier language, in
Anderson v. 42 Broadway Co., 239 U.S. 69, 73 (1915), that "[t]he act of 1909 was in no
proper sense an income tax nor intended as such, but was an excise upon the conduct
of business in a corporate capacity. The tax being assessed by reference to the income
in a manner prescribed by the Act itself."
By contrast, the Court had already, at least impliedly, ruled in Lynch v. Turrish,
247 U.S. 221 (1918), that there was no distinction between the 1867 Income Tax Act,
under which Darlington was decided, and the 1913 Income Tax Act. "Granting that
there is a shade of difference between the words [of the two Acts], it cannot be
granted that Congress made that shade a criterion of intention and committed the con-
struction of its legislation to the disputes of purists." Id. at 224.
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The question is one of definition, and the answer to it may be
found in recent decisions of this court.
The Corporation Excise Tax Act of August 5, 1909, c. 6, 36
Stat. 11, 112, was not an income tax law, but a definition of the
word "income" was so necessary in its administration that in an
early case it was formulated as "the gain derived from capital,
from labor, or from both combined."
This definition, frequently approved by this court, received
an addition, in its latest income tax decision, which is especially
significant in its application to such a case as we have here, so
that it now reads: "'Income may be defined as a gain derived
from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be
understood to include profit gained through sale or conversion
of capital assets."32
The Court cited Darlington but simply stated that it was adequately
distinguished in Gauley Mountain Coal Co. The Court ruled the ad-
vance to be taxable income within the meaning of the sixteenth
amendment.3 In fact, the Supreme Court used a definition of the
word "income" that had been derived from a corporation excise tax
statute"4 and developed in cases decided after the adoption of the
sixteenth amendment. What had been so clearly a return of capital
to the Supreme Court in 1897 was transformed through the alchemy
of economics into taxable income. It has been pointed out that a
decision in favor of the taxpayer in Merchants' Loan and Trust Co.
would have destroyed a large source of income for a government
then in dire need and could have delivered a severe blow to the
finances of the country." The historical and economic forces behind
the decision now fade into obscurity. However, a clear case may be
made for the proposition that in the early development of our
capital gains tax structure, this country chose the wrong path, from
which no return has been possible. In short, it may be argued that
32. 255 U.S. at 517, quoting Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (emphasis in
text) (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 521. See also Walsh v. Brewster, 255 U.S. 536 (1921); Eldorado Coal &
Mining Co. v. Mager, 255 U.S. 522 (1921).
34. One commentator has classified the Court's reasoning as ex post facto:
Accordingly, the decision which treated those cases [under the 1909 Corporation
Excise Tax Act] as precedent is in a manner of speaking, a decision based on ex
post facto reasoning. The logic would seem to run something like this: After 1913,
we, the Court, decided [under an Excise Tax Act] that income included gains from
conversion of capital assets. Therefore, in 1913, the word "income" [as included in
a constitutional amendment providing for an income tax) must have been intended
by the legislature to carry the same meaning.
Note, supra note 26, at 72.
35. Id.
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the country adopted an incorrect approach to the taxation of capital
transactions, resulting in a needlessly complex taxation system.
As a result of these decisions interpreting the sixteenth amend-
ment, the Revenue Acts, from 1913 through 1921, taxed capital
gains in the same manner as any other income. Gains were included
with other income and were subject to both a normal tax and a sur-
tax at the full rates under the then-existing tax structure. Con-
sistently, capital losses were deductible in full from gross income in
arriving at net income in the years after 1917. In 1916, losses were
allowed only to the extent of gains. There was general dissatis-
faction with this treatment of capital transactions.36 The system did
not result in an increase in revenues; instead it acted merely to
deter taxpayers from realizing gains and furnished an incentive to
realize losses and to withdraw capital from business enterprises for
the purpose of investment in exempt securities. 7 Thus, the impact
of taxing gains from capital transactions in the same manner as
other income was the "freezing in" of capital with investors simply
holding and not selling assets with such gains."
In 1921 the tax structure for capital gains was entirely re-
vamped; a separate and preferential system for taxing these gains
was installed in an effort to "unlock" the capital markets. The
Revenue Act of 1921"' provided that the excess of capital gains"0
over capital losses, or capital net gain, arising from the sale of prop-
erty held for more than two years could, at the option of the tax-
payer, be omitted from ordinary net income and taxed separately at
a flat rate of 12-1/2%. This very substantial reduction in tax rates'
relative to capital gains was favorable to those in higher tax
brackets. Under the 1921 Act capital net losses were deductible in
full against other income.
36. See Hogan, The Capital Gains Tax, 9 TAXES 165 (1931).
37. Comment, Profit on Investments as Taxable Income, 30 YALE L.J. 396, 400
(1920).
38. See Tremaine, The Capital Gains Tax, 15 TAXES 517 (1931) (pointing out dif-
ficulties coming from those who do not trade and those who have profits but will not
take them).
39. Income Tax Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 200-63, 42 Stat. 227.
40. "Capital assets" were defined in the Act as
property acquired and held by the taxpayer for profit or investment for more
than two years [but not including] . . . property held for the personal use or con-
sumption of the taxpayer or his family or stock in trade of the taxpayer or other
property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the tax-
payer if on hand at the close of the taxable year.
Id. at § 206(a)(b).
41. During the period from 1913 to 1921, capital gains had been taxed at rates as
high as 73%.
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This system of taxation of capital gains prevailed substantially
intact until 1934. However, the Revenue Act of 19242 provided that
capital net losses could not be deducted from ordinary income if the
result were to reduce the normal tax and the surtax by more than
12-1/z/o of the amount of the net loss. In 1932, Congress modified the
treatment of losses on sales of stocks and bonds held for two years
or less; losses were allowed as deductions only to the extent of gains
arising from the sales of stocks and bonds held for two years or less.
The excess of losses over gains resulting from these short-term in-
vestments could not be charged off against the other income of the
taxpayer. This limitation was primarily a reaction to the large losses
in securities portfolios following the Crash of 1929; initially a provi-
sion existed for a one-year carryforward for such losses, but this
was abolished in 1933.
By 1932, the preferential system of taxing capital gains in-
stituted in 1921, and utilized through the twenties and early thirties,
was under attack." One author notes that the House Committee on
Ways and Means indicated five defects in the system." First, the
system tended to produce unstable revenue-large receipts in pros-
perous years and low receipts in depression years. Second, evidence
suggested that in many instances the capital gains tax was imposed
on the mere increase in monetary value resulting from the deprecia-
tion of the dollar instead of a "real" increment in value. Third, tax-
payers tended to take their losses within the two-year period and to
obtain the full benefit allowed by law, while delaying the recognition
of gains until the expiration of the two-year period. The use of these
tactics by taxpayers substantially reduced taxes. Fourth, the relief
afforded in transactions of more than two years was inequitable, ef-
fectively providing relief only to taxpayers whose net income ex-
ceeded $16,000. Finally, in some instances, the tax hindered normal
business transactions. 5
Consequently, in 1934, the tax system was completely scrapped
and a new graduated tax system developed." The optional 12-1/2%
maximum tax was abolished and capital gains again became subject
to the same rates as ordinary income. However, the amount of the
gain taxed depended upon the length of time the capital asset was
held. If the asset had been held for less than one year, 100/o of the
gain was taxed; one to two years, 80%; two to five years, 60%; five
42. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 200, 43 Stat. 254.
43. Raymond, The Capital Gains Loophole, 10 TAXES 373 (1932).
44. Hogan, Capital Gains Under the Revenue Act of 1934, 12 TAXES 339 (1934).
45. Id. at 340.
46. Income Tax Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 683.
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to ten years, 40%; and more than ten years, 30%. Losses from the
sale of capital assets were allowed only to the extent of $2,000, plus
the amount of the capital gains.'" Thus, if the losses exceeded the
gains in a given year, only $2,000 in excess could be deducted
against ordinary income. It was significant that the definition of
"capital asset" was changed to eliminate the two-year limitation.'8
The Act of 1934 is apparently the genesis of the tax structure which
allows a certain portion of a capital gain as a deduction from or-
dinary income. This tax structure remained on the books substan-
tially unchanged for four years.
In 1938, Congress scrapped the existing capital transaction tax
system and created an entirely new one.49 The 1938 Act made first
mention of the terms "short term" and "long term," used to
designate the two types of capital gains and losses."° Assets held
less than one and one-half years fell into the first category, and
those held longer were placed in the second group." The 1938
statute provided that short-term gains were fully taxable and that
short-term losses could be deducted fully from the short-term
gains." The excess of short-term losses, if any, was not currently
deductible, but there was a one-year carryforward provision. Sixty-
six and two-thirds percent of long-term gains and losses was
recognized if the assets were held for more than eighteen months
but less than two years, while 50% was considered if the assets
were held longer than two years. Curiously, net long-term gains
were subject to an alternate tax rate of 30% if a lower tax resulted.
The practical impact of this alternative computation is interestihg.
The statute required that 66-1/3% of the eighteen to twenty-four-
month gains and losses and 50% of the over twenty-four-month
gains and losses be combined to produce a net long-term capital gain
or net long-term capital loss." The tax was then computed by one of
two methods: (1) the computation of the normal tax and surtax on
the net income, inclusive of the long-term capital items or (2) the
calculation of the normal tax and surtax on the net income exclusive
of the long-term capital items, plus 30% of the net long-term capital
gains or minus 30% of the net long-term capital loss.5' The result
producing the lesser tax was the proper method.
47. Id. at § 117.
48. Id. at § 117(b).
49. Income Tax Act of 1938, ch. 289, 52 Stat. 452.
50. Id. at § 117(a).
51. Id.
52. Id. at § 117(b).
53. Id.
54. Id. at § 117(c).
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It was perfectly clear that the tax on long-term capital gains
could not exceed 20% (66-2/3% x 30%) of the eighteen to twenty-
four-month gains and 15/o (50/o x 30%) of the more than twenty-
four-month gains. This tax system thus parallels closely the 12-1/z%
flat rate alternative tax structure prevailing in 1921-1934 for tax-
payers in higher brackets. Rather than a 12-1/z% flat rate, the Act
of 1938 embodied a 15% and 20%, respectively, flat rate. Apparent-
ly, this arrangement placated those who criticized the 1934 Act on
the grounds that the tax rates were too high, especially in the case
of high tax bracket taxpayers, and that assets became frozen and
few transactions took place, resulting in a revenue loss.55 The cycle
had returned to its beginning; a close analogy existed between the
effects of the pre-1921 taxation system and the 1934 Act, as well as
between the 1921 amendments to remedy the effects of the prior
system and the 1938' Revenue Acts, enacted to remedy the effects
of the 1934 Act.
In 1942 significant changes were made in the capital gains tax-
ing rates and structure." The changes may be viewed as the logical
wartime progression of the philosophy stated in the 1938 Act.
However, the flat rate alternative tax concept was retained. During
the war years, the need for revenue had caused the individual or-
dinary rates to be increased drastically. Essentially, the eighteen-
month/twenty-four-month holding period dichotomy was replaced by
a single holding period combined with a 50% deduction for long-
term capital gains. The great debate in 1942 was the length of the
holding period required for special long-term capital gains treatment.
The Securities and Exchange Commission and legislation relating to
the regulation of securities transactions set a six-month limit as the
measure of a speculative turn in securities.58 Congress decided that
the SEC rule would work well for the Treasury,59 and the Senate
Finance Committee adopted the six-month provision."0 Since realiza-
55. Wells, Legislative History of Treatment of Capital Gains Under the Federal
Income Tax, 1913-1948, 2 NAT'L TAX J. 12 (1949).
56. The definition of "capital assets" was also modified to add the words "to
customers" in the exclusion from capital assets of property held by the taxpayer
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.
The purpose of this change was to make the profits and losses of a trader in
securities subject to the capital gain and loss provisions to prevent tax loss through
the unlimited deductibility of losses by the stock speculator trading on his own ac-
count.
57. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, 56 Stat. 798.
58. See Wells, Legislative History of Treatment of Capital Gains Under the
Federal Income Tax, 1913-1948, 2 NAT'L TAX J. 12, 28-32 (1949).
59. Id. at 32.
60. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, THE REVENUE BILL OF 1942, S. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1942).
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tion of a capital gain was entirely within the discretion of the tax-
payer, the Committee believed that the shortening of the holding
period would encourage the realization of capital gains and thereby
direct added revenues to the Treasury.61 Thus, the holding period
for long-term capital gains treatment was reduced drastically in
1942 to six months. The alternative maximum rate was retained and
increased to 500/o; the increase yielded only -a maximum effective
long-term capital gains rate of 25/o, since only 50/o of the gains was
taken into account. Both long-term and short-term capital losses
were deductible only against capital gains, but $1,000 of ordinary in-
come could be offset by the excess of capital loss over capital gain.
However, a five-year carryover for net capital losses was provided,
resulting in a maximum offset of $6,000 against ordinary income.
The flexibility in terms of the scheduling of capital transactions
reduced significantly the chance that a taxpayer would allow the
carryover period to expire without fully using a capital loss.2
Since 1942, many changes in the details of taxation relating to
capital transactions have occurred. These modifications have
primarily been provisions relating to various types of abuses, the
correction of particular inequities, and the closing of special
loopholes. For example, in the 1950 Revenue Act,"3 provisions were
inserted in the tax statute concerning collapsible corporations, short
sales, and treatment of literary, musical, and artistic property."'
These provisions were designed to stop the alchemical transmuta-
tion of ordinary income into capital gain." However, the tax struc-
ture for capital gains remained essentially the same with a 50% ex-
clusion of long-term capital gain from ordinary income and an alter-
native tax until 1969. The Tax Reform Act of 196966 provided a
61. Id.
62. In addition, the capital asset definition was modified to exclude real property
used in the trade or business. This was done to give consistent treatment to that given
the generically similar assets, depreciable property used in the trade or business,
which were excluded in 1938. This was, of course, simply legislative sleight of hand; both
types of property found their way into section 117(d) of the 1942 Act. It had been con-
tended that many of the business transactions of this wartime period contained an "in-
voluntary" element and should receive treatment accorded involuntary conversions,
which were at a high level because of war risks. See Wells, supra note 58, at 32.
63. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, 64 Stat. 910.
64. Id. at § 210(a).
65. Taxpayers used corporations to develop property for sale; when the develop-
ment was on the verge of producing income, the stock was sold or the corporation
liquidated in hopes of realizing the gain in a capital transaction. Similarly, efforts not
materially different from other types of personal labor, when cast in the form of a
copyright or patent and sold, were capable of producing capital gains, under the inter-
pretations of the law prior to 1950.
66. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
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number of important changes in the law of capital transaction taxa-
tion. The alternative tax with respect to individuals was gradually
phased out and was totally eliminated in 197817 for net long-term
capital gains in excess of $50,000. For net long-term capital gains of
less than $50,000, the method of deducting 50% of these gains sub-
ject to a 25% alternative tax was retained.68 Net long-term capital
losses could be used to offset ordinary income up to $1,000 on a two-
for-one basis, i.e., two dollars of loss were needed to offset one
dollar of ordinary income. The excess was not eligible for carryover.
In 1978, capital gains taxation was altered significantly by
changing the exclusion from income of net long-term capital gains
from 50% to 60/o.69 Thus, for capital transactions occurring after
the effective date of the provision-October 31, 1978-only 40% of
the net long-term capital gains was includible in taxable income.
Further, the last vestige of the alternative capital gains maximum
tax was eliminated by repeal of the alternative tax on the first
$50,000 of long-term capital gains." The allowance of deductions of
long-term and short-term capital losses only against capital gains
was continued, but non-corporate taxpayers were allowed a $3,000
maximum offset against ordinary income.71
RATIONALE FOR THE PREFERENCE
Since the inception of income taxation in this country during the
War Between the States, only a seven-year period was devoid of
preferential capital gains taxation. During this period, 1913-1920,
gains from capital transactions were simply added to the rest of a
taxpayer's income and taxed at the regular rates.12 Apparently, ex-
treme dissatisfaction precluded any recurrence of this simplified
system of capital gains treatment. The scheme allowing the aggrega-
tion of capital gains with ordinary income was rejected mainly on
the assumption that it tended to "freeze" capital; capital trans-
actions were inhibited, resulting in losses of prosperity and
revenue." The country also experimented briefly with no taxation of
capital gains under the Civil War Income Tax Acts.7' Exclusion of
67. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1786 (amending I.R.C. §
1201).
68. Id.
69. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2866 (amending I.R.C. §
1202).
70. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1786 (amending I.R.C. §
1201).
71. I.R.C. § 1211(b).
72. Income Tax Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
73. Note, supra note 26, at 72.
74. See Gray v. Darlington, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 63 (1872). See text at note 11, supra.
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capital gains from taxation was ultimately rejected on the ground
that a large source of revenue would be lost. In effect, the United
State rejected both ends of the capital taxation continuum for the
same reason-each system would result in less revenue to the
Treasury. Not taxing capital gains would eliminate a source of
revenue and, unless compensated, would diminish total tax receipts.
It was feared that the taxation of capital gains in full at the rates
prevailing in 1913-1920 (and most years thereafter) would discourage
taxpayers from realizing capital gains. Therefore, unless Congress
or the Court was inclined to tamper with the doctrine of realization,"5
the result would be fewer capital transactions, fewer capital gains
and losses, diminished taxes, and general rigidity in the capital
market. Two diametrically opposed treatments of taxation for
capital transactions were eliminated in favor of a moderate taxation
scheme generating the best results.
The result has been that while a capital gain is some sort of in-
come7 6 and should be taxed, it is not equivalent to earned income
and should receive special treatment. Writers have advocated
special treatment for capital gains because capital transactions
generally are not recurring.77 However, many other types of income
may not have a repetitive nature, such as a year-end bonus, a tax-
able award or prize, or a one-time contractual fee. No one suggests
that such income should be excluded because it occurs only once in a
person's lifetime; a conceptual difference between non-repetitive or-
dinary income and isolated capital gains, justifying different treat-
ment on a "recurrence" basis, is difficult to discern.
A more appealing and more logical conclusion is that capital
gains should be treated preferentially because the gains realized in
the current year in reality reflect those accumulated in previous
years. 8 The argument is that taxation of a capital gain in one year
at graduated rates resulting in a higher tax seems unfair, since the
gain built up over a period of years, if realized in each year, would
have meant a lower total tax liability. One-time cumulative recogni-
tion of gains is not an attribute of a capital asset, but is a corollary
of the realization concept as enunciated by the Supreme Court;79
gains are "locked in" immutably until some event of realization
75. See Lowndes, The Taxation of Capital Gains and Losses Under the Federal
Income Tax, 26 TEx. L. REV. 440 (1948). See also Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189
(1920).
76. See notes 33-35, supra, and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Parker, Capital Gains and Losses, 14 TAXES 604 (1936).
78. See Miller, The "Capital Asset" Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains Taxa-
tion: 1, 59 YALE L.J. 837 (1950).
79. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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mystically releases them into the mainstream of taxation. Realiza-
tion and the consequential uneven taxation of capital gains are con-
cessions to practical management of a tax system, rather than some
inherent attribute of a capital gain.
Many types of "bunched" income do not, nor is it argued that
they should, receive capital or special treatment." For instance, a
musician may labor a lifetime on a musical masterpiece; the
copyright, if sold in a single year, results in a greater tax than if he
had produced several lesser pieces over the years. The same tax
outcome occurs for persons such as artists, writers, and tax lawyers
who render opinions after years of research. Capital gains are not
treated unfairly when compared to the many other cases of a
theoretical grouping or bunching of income which occurs in a single
year.81
An often-cited reason for the preferential treatment of capital
gains is that really no gain exists to be taxed." This rationale sug-
gests that a capital gain is merely a current gauge of the value of
money. Thus, a taxpayer who bought vacant land in 1970 for $10,000
and finds that he can sell it unimproved and unchanged in 1980 for
$30,000, discovers that the dollar is worth one-third in 1980 of its
1970 value. The proposition that a capital gain simply indicates the
variation in the value of money has been used for many years to
justify preferential treatment.83 The idea is appealing but defies em-
pirical analysis.
Since all gains take place inside the economic system, no other
context can be given to develop the "true" worth or value of the
gain. Even the most thorough analysis could only conclude that if
various economic factors were different, the gain would be larger or
80. Certain types of "bunched" income may receive relief if the income averaging
provisions of I.R.C. §§ 1301-05 can be met.
81. Originally, the holding period was thought to be some concession to resolution
of this problem. The initial holding period in 1921 of two years was thought to
separate those speculative gains occurring in the short run, when no bunching or
grouping of income would be probable, from those longer term gains when real bun-
ching was apparent and relief called for. In short, lesser tax was warranted on capital
transactions when it was clear that bunching would create an unfair situation. In 1942,
and lasting for the next 25 years, the holding period was reduced to six months. It has
been suggested that this new period was representative of the philosophy that gain on
sale of an investment is entitled to special treatment, not because it accrued over more
than one fiscal period, but because "by its very nature, it represents a much lesser
ability to pay." Miller, supra note 78, at 841. Surely, in light of this development, the
bunching concept must be suspect.
82. Johnson, The Philosophy of Specialized Treatment for Capital Gains, 13 N.Y.
UNIV. INST. FED. TAX. 1161 (1955).
83. See, e.g., Hogan, supra note 44.
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smaller. In addition, the contention that asset prices reflect changes
in the value of money has no special applicability to capital gains.
The general marketplace factors operating to increase or decrease
the worth of a dollar have the same effect, whether the dollars are
earned by laboring in a steel mill or by selling a share of U.S. Steel
stock. Conversely, if the operative factors are not affecting the
economy across the board, the specific investment, not the dollar,
has increased or decreased in value for particular reasons.
Another argument offered for preferential capital gains taxation
is that taxation like that of other income would destroy incentive. 4
Thus, it is necessary for the general public to bear part of the cost
of the risk-taking in the accumulation of private capital. The quid
pro quo for this societal cost is unclear, unless the failure to under-
write a portion of this risk-taking would severely inhibit capital
transfers and accumulation and cause the loss of jobs and prosperity.
Again, the preferential taxation of capital gains seems rationalized
by the unknown, and perhaps unknowable, conclusion. A reasonable
conclusion is that the maintenance of preferential capital gains taxa-
tion results in increased rates of taxation on ordinary income to sus-
tain the same revenue level and a resulting disincentive to work to
produce more ordinary income. It may be argued that the elimina-
tion of the preferential treatment of capital gains would fragment
the United States capital pool into a greater number of smaller
units. Special capital gains treatment appears to be supported more
by a visceral belief that such income is special and should be
segregated in treatment from other types of income, rather than by
hard analysis justifying the preferential aspects of the system. With
few exceptions, for sixty years the United States scheme of taxation
has rewarded ingenious devices for accumulating capital gains.
One cost of this special treatment of capital gains has been a
system of taxation far more complex than is necessary. 6 Ingenious
taxpayers constantly are devising methods to attempt to bring
various types of income and various transactions under the ambit of
capital gains taxation. The Treasury then attempts to close the new
loophole. An example is the development of real property through
the use of a corporation and the subsequent sale of the stock prior
to realizing the gains from the sale of the real property in the or-
dinary course of business; this strategy was designed to change the
ordinary income from the sale of such property into capital gain.
84. Johnson, supra note 82, at 1163.
85. The periods 1913-20 and 1934-38 may be cited as exceptions.
86. See Raymond, supra note 43, at 373.
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The Treasury countered with the perversely complex collapsible cor-
poration provisions.87 History also has witnessed the incorporated
pocket book and the accumulation of corporate earnings later
treated as capital gains when the stock is sold. The Treasury has
responded with the accumulated earnings and personal holding com-
pany statutes."
The entire system of taxation in the United States is based upon
the graduated rate-ability to pay-concept.89 A common belief is
that as income rises, the ability to pay a tax increases, and,
therefore, a higher tax rate is justifiable. This concept finds favor
throughout the tax system, particularly with graduated tax rates on
incomes, gifts, and estates. The most notable exception to this idea
is in the capital gains area. With the possible exceptions of the
1913-1920 period, when capital gains were taxed like any other in-
come,"0 and 1934-1938, when a "graduated" deduction system was in
effect,91 capital gains for upper bracket taxpayers have been taxed
at a maximum flat rate. From 1921 through 1934, capital gains were
taxed under an alternative flat rate system subject to a maximum
rate of 12-1/2%.92 Any taxpayer in a bracket higher than 12-1/2/0 was
taxed at the flat rate on his capital gains. For those taxpayers the
capital gains tax was not graduated or progressive in the sense of
requiring payment of a greater rate of tax as the ability to pay in-
creased.
In 1938, the capital gains tax structure acquired a faint similarity
to a graduated tax when a two-tier system was instituted for long-
term capital gains. However, until 1979, some form of alternative
flat rate tax has been in effect. For example, during most of the for-
ties and fifties, the alternative maximum tax on capital gains was
25%.9" At some level the interplay between the taxpayer's marginal
rate and the 50% deduction made the flat rate effective and deprived
the tax of further progressiveness. Presumably, this level was
somewhere above the marginal rate of 50% in the graduated scale.
Thus, one may seriously question whether the capital gains tax has
87. I.R.C. § 341.
88. Id. at §§ 531 & 541.
89. See Johnson, supra note 82, at 1162.
90. Income Tax Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
91. Income Tax Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 683.
92. Income Tax Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 260-63, 42 Stat. 227.
93. Two-thirds of the gains on property held for more than eighteen months but
less than two years and one-half of the gains on property held for more than twenty-
four months were included in income and taxed at the graduated rates.
94. I.R.C. § 1201(b) (1954) (current version at I.R.C. § 1201).
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been a truly graduated tax founded on the ability to pay during
most of its existence in the United States.
THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE
The capital gains tax structure must again be scrapped if it is
ever to be streamlined and simplified. Assuming that these at-
tributes are desirable goals from the standpoint of revenue manage-
ment and equitable and logical application of the law, the perennial
finagling with the capital gains provisions will not attain these ob-
jectives. The present confusion necessitates substantial revision.
The mistakes found in the history of capital gains taxation pro-
vide certain "given" parameters to any future rectification. Seven
decades of acceptance, although grudging at times, must convince
even the most reluctant populist that certain capital gains will re-
quire preferential treatment. The American people seem to want at
least some types of capital gains to escape the rigors of taxation of
ordinary income. Conversely, the staunchest capitalist is aware that
no statute exempting all capital gains from taxation will ever be
passed. Further, the concept of realization remains a practical
necessity if use of the annual accounting period and the avoidance of
yearly appraisals of all capital assets are desired. In an intensely
practical activity such as collection of revenues, the adminstrative
difficulties of annual appraisals to measure each year's economic in-
cremental difference cannot be advocated lightly. Finally, if simplicity
is a proper objective, the incessant striving to change ordinary in-
come into capital gains must be retarded or eliminated. 5
Accomplishment of these ends may require a number of non-
exclusive changes in the capital gains taxing structure. First, the
holding period for so-called long-term capital gains treatment should
be abolished and the terms "long-term" and "short-term" capital
gain eliminated. History demonstrates that these holding periods
are completely arbitrary; the dividing line between the two periods
varied from two years in 1921, a maximum of ten years in 1934, and
a minimum of six months in most of the 1940's and 1950's. The
stated goal of these periods, the allowance of special treatment only
for "long-term" investments, has been easily thwarted, repeatedly
requiring complex remedial legislation." The capital nature of a
transaction must be determined by reference to the asset, rather
than to the holding period.
95. To the extent the issue encroaches upon the double taxation problem with cor-
porations, treatment is excluded, as beyond the scope of this article.
96. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1233.
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Second, the gain or loss should receive special treatment if the
asset qualifies as a capital asset and the other requirements men-
tioned in this article are met. All other gains and losses should be
taxed at the ordinary rates. The definition of a capital asset should
be revised from its present negative orientation; capital assets
should not be a residual category into which every non-enumerated
asset falls. Section 1221 establishes the capital asset as the norm
from which a few types of property are excluded.97 This definition
permits imaginative taxpayers to create new "capital assets" not
quite covered by the listed exceptions. Conversely, the new statute
should be drafted to specify clearly-established assets given prefer-
ential tax treatment. Gains from the sale, exchange, or disposition of
all other property should be ordinary gains; non-capital assets
should constitute the residual category. Similarly, events of realiza-
tion should include the concept of "dispositions" rather than mere
"sales and exchanges."98
Importantly, a new tax structure would prohibit capital gains
tax treatment in business contexts. A capital transaction should be
considered identical to any other transaction when it occurs in a
business setting. The Supreme Court actually recognized this
equivalence in the Corn Products9 case; the Court held that a trans-
action which otherwise met the definitional requirements of a
capital transaction was nonetheless denied capital gains treatment
because of its complete connexity with the taxpayer's business. Pro-
hibition of capital gains treatment in business transactions would
retard or eliminate many present attempts at converting ordinary
income into capital gain. Business activities structured in convoluted
and circumspect ways to appear like capital transactions would be
deterred, since the business nature of the dealings would preclude
any preferential tax benefits. Many liquidations, reincorporations,
mergers, reorganizations, and other complex transactions could be
avoided entirely. Nonetheless, capital treatment would still be
available to those taxpayers in non-business, traditional, investor-
trader roles. Unnecessary differences between the treatment of real
estate dealers and securities traders would be obviated, assuming
that those assets were held in a non-business context and were spe-
cifically enumerated as capital assets.
To appease businessmen for the elimination of capital gains
treatment, the provisions for capital losses should undergo a bene-
97. Id. at § 1221.
98. This obviates the Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952), problems
which introduce needless artificiality in this area of the law.
99. Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
[Vol. 41
CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION
ficial change. Uncertainty exists as to whether capital gains have
warranted special treatment because capital loss deductions are
limited, or whether capital loss deductions are restricted because
capital gains enjoy preferential treatment. History indicates that the
preferential treatment of capital gains originated in 1921, when
capital losses were fully deductible. Although this situation was
short-lived, no real revenue problem with capital losses arose until
tax returns for the year 1929 were filed. Due to the tremendous
losses sustained by securities portfolios after the Crash, a large
revenue loss was foreseeable; Congress acted quickly to confine the
losses roughly to the amount of the gains. This treatment of losses
has stayed unchanged for fifty years, despite many repetitions,
although much less severe, of the boom-bust cycle. If business
capital gains are taxed like other business income, businessmen
must be allowed to deduct fully losses which presently are con-
sidered capital in nature. The need for special provisions such as
section 1231,1"0 relating to business sales and exchanges of property,
would be averted.
Enactment of the preceding suggestions would marshal capital
gains taxation into a more manageable scheme. The distinction be-
tween gains and losses occurring within the daily operation of a tax-
payer's business and those resulting from more passively-oriented
capital investments is logically defensible. The historical and concep-
tual premises supporting the capital gains preference are more ap-
plicable to transactions not occuring in day-to-day business ac-
tivities. The preference, if one is desired, should ensure access to
capital investment for taxpayers at every level, rather than supply
tax advantages to a limited number of businesses merely because of
the ingenious structuring of an income-producing transaction.
100. The reason for the existence of the provision was apparently the result of the
abnormal circumstances of World War II, but it has been retained in the law.
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